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This paper develops a Bayesian persuasion model examining a manager’s in-
centives to gather information when the manager can disseminate this information
selectively to users and when the objectives of the manager and the users are not
perfectly aligned. The model predicts that, if the manager can choose the sub-
set of users to receive the information, then the manager may gather more precise
information. The paper identifies conditions under which a regime that allows man-
agers to grant access to information selectively maximizes aggregate information.
Strikingly, this happens when the objectives of managers and users are sufficiently
misaligned. These results call into doubt the common belief that forcing man-
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Common practices, rules and regulations require that managers communicate in-
formation to all potential internal and external users of this information. Regula-
tion Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), for example, prohibits selective disclosure. Broadly
speaking, any such regulations pursue the dual objectives (i) to level the playing
field, i.e., ensure fairness, and (ii) to increase the aggregate amount of information
in the marketplace: “the market is best served by more, not less, disclosure of
information by issuers.”1 While the fairness benefits of Reg FD appear uncontro-
versial, the informational benefits are less so. One might reason that, after Reg
FD, the consensus analyst forecast would be more accurate because all analysts
receive the same access to information. The literature, however, provides mixed
empirical evidence. Herrmann, Hope and Thomas (2008), for example, show an
increase in the average analyst forecast accuracy, while Agrawal, Chadha and Chen
(2006) document a decrease. Francis, Nanda and Wang (2006) and Heflin, Sub-
ramanyam and Zhang (2003) find no evidence of significant change. Moreover,
at a post-adoption roundtable discussion, analysts and other panelists expressed
concerns that Reg FD had diminished the quantity and quality of the information
disseminated by firms.2 Illuminating the mechanisms that drive these observations
requires a theoretical framework that links the managers’ ability to disseminate
information selectively with factors that influence the quality of information.
The standard view is fairness and greater availability of information at an ag-
gregate level go “hand in hand”. The justification for this view is that, provided
1See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599,
File No. S7-31-99 (Aug. 15 2000), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
2See Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, Report by Commissioner Laura S. Unger,
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm.
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managers report truthfully, they disseminate the same quality of information re-
gardless of who observes it. However, this argument ignores the fact that the
quality of information is endogenous. Managers choose not only to whom to dis-
close the information but also whether and what quality of information to gather
in the first place, and this choice may be affected by the size of the anticipated
audience.
Managers’ incentives to gather information also depend on their objectives.
Often their objectives are not perfectly aligned with those of users. Consider, as an
example, information dissemination by a manager to financial analysts (hereafter,
“the leading example”). Analysts interact with investors repeatedly and therefore
have long-term incentives to provide accurate forecasts. In addition, as Groysberg,
Healy, and Maber (2011) show, part of analysts’ compensation is based on trading
commissions. Thus, to amplify trading volume, analysts may have short-term
incentives to bias their forecasts upward in good states and downwards in bad
ones (Beyer and Guttman, 2011). The firm manager, on the other hand, may
prefer a consensus forecast that only partially reflects the economic earnings and is
biased toward a specific value. For example, the manager may be biased toward a
high forecast because it increases the firm’s stock price and hence her stock-based
compensation.3
This paper studies the effects of managers’ discretion to limit access to in-
formation to a subset of users on the managers’ incentives to gather information
and thereby on the aggregate information available to market participants (which,
within the confines of the model, allows me to make inferences about ex ante effi-
3The standard view is that managers like high forecasts, but this need not always be the case.
For example, managers may like low forecasts before option grant date to trigger a low exercise
price. In addition, low forecasts are easier to beat.
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ciency). In doing so, it examines whether there is a trade-off between the fairness
and information objectives mentioned above. I develop a model of Bayesian per-
suasion with information control that builds on Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).4
The players—a firm manager (“she”) and a group of identical users (“they” in plu-
ral, “he” in singular)—have misaligned preferences. The manager can influence the
sensitivity with which the users will react to the information eventually revealed
by choosing the precision of an information system that she implements. The main
innovation of my model is that the manager’s preferences over the actions of a
certain subset of users depend on the actions of the users outside this subset.5
As a result, besides controlling the information precision, the manager, if granted
discretion, can also control the aggregate amount of information by strategically
choosing the subset of users who observe the signal of the state of nature (e.g., the
economic earnings).
The first part of the paper considers a stylized setting in which the implementa-
tion of an information system is cost-free. The analysis shows that, if the manager
does not have discretion over the access to information, she implements a perfectly
revealing information system only if her preferences are sufficiently aligned with
those of the users.6 The intuition behind this result is that, when the players’
objectives are sufficiently misaligned, the users react too sensitively to the signal
from the manager’s point of view. Hence the manager is better off not providing
4In the leading example, shifting the focus to the information gathering stage links two issues
that are commonly considered by separate research strands: (i) internal information system
implementation and control (usually analyzed in managerial accounting) and (ii) information
communication to external users (usually analyzed in financial accounting).
5In the leading example, managers care about the consensus forecast, and so their preferences
over the forecasts of a certain subset of analysts depend on the forecasts of the other analysts.
6This is a variation of the findings in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
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information and leaving the users act on their prior.7 In contrast, if the manager
has discretion over restricting access to information, she always implements a per-
fectly revealing system. This result is not immediately intuitive for a setting with
ex ante identical users. The rationale behind it is that by keeping some of the users
“in the dark” the manager can regulate the sensitivity of the users’ aggregate action
to changes in the state of nature. As a result of this additional degree of freedom,
the manager now finds it in her best interest to implement the most informative
system, the output of which is only selectively disseminated. As one would expect,
the optimal fraction of privileged users who get to observe the signal is increasing
in the degree of players’ objective alignment.
A corollary of the preceding discussion is that, if the players’ preferences are
sufficiently misaligned, a regime that allows for information discrimination (“un-
regulated dissemination”) maximizes aggregate information. Among the players
considered, unregulated dissemination Pareto dominates a regime that requires in-
formation dissemination to all users (“mandated dissemination”). It makes better
off the manager (by revealed preference) as well as some users (because they receive
information that would not be available otherwise) without making the other users
worse off (because they do not observe information anyway).8 Paradoxically, when
the players’ preferences over actions are misaligned, their preferences over regimes
are aligned. The opposite is also true: when the players’ preferences over actions
7As anecdotal evidence, in July 2013 SEC required Urban Outfitters to publicly disclose the
effect of direct-to-customer sales on the net retail segment sales. In response, Urban Outfitters
declared that effective Q1/2014 the company will no longer gather this information even for
internal purposes.
8To focus on the information gathering incentives of the manager I do not model a trading
game. Asymmetric dissemination in a larger model with investors ”buying ” information from
analysts and then trading on this information, would redistribute (expected) trading surplus and
will leave those investors not in the loop worse off. No Pareto ranking then could be made.
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are sufficiently aligned, their preferences over regimes are misaligned. The manager
then prefers unregulated dissemination, while all users at least weakly prefer man-
dated dissemination. This result calls into doubt the conventional wisdom that
regulating information dissemination and requiring equal access to information is
especially needed when the incentive conflict is severe. Ironically, under this sce-
nario, regulations forcing equal access to information will promote fairness but at
the expense of reduced overall information.
With costless information acquisition, the optimal precision is a bang-bang
solution: the manager implements either a perfectly revealing information system
or one that does not convey any information at all. However, interior precision levels
and information acquisition costs are frequently observed in practice. Therefore,
in the second part of the paper, I consider costly implementation. I find that, if
the fraction of informed users were exogenous, then the interior optimal precision
level would be lower, the farther this fraction is from the one the manager would
choose if she could.
When the preferences between the players are misaligned, the Pareto ranking
of mandated and unregulated dissemination regimes remains the same. However,
when preferences over actions are aligned, the introduction of precision costs creates
disagreement between the users regarding the preferred regime. The assessment of
the aggregate users’ welfare depends on two countervailing effects: (i) a precision
effect—the information collected under unregulated dissemination is more precise
than under mandated dissemination and (ii) an omission effect—the fraction of
users who observe the information under unregulated dissemination is lower than
under mandated dissemination. The paper identifies sufficient conditions under
which the users are better off, on an aggregate level, under unregulated dissem-
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ination. Put differently, even the users themselves, at some prior state, would
collectively agree to unregulated dissemination, as long as they are behind the veil
of ignorance (Harsanyi, 1955), i.e., before each learns whether he will be included
in the group of informed users.
Another way to look at the efficiency effects of the manager’s ability to limit
access to information is by considering the accuracy of the aggregate users’ action.
In the leading example, this reflects the accuracy of the analysts’ consensus forecast.
My results suggests that at least some of the inconclusive findings in the empirical
literature on the changes in forecast accuracy before and after Reg FD may be due
to unobserved cross-sectional differences, e.g., in the degree of interest alignment
between management and analysts or the costs associated with the implementation
of internal controls.
My model has features in common with the mandatory and the voluntary dis-
closure literature. The key difference is the timing: the information dissemination
is only voluntary ex ante when the manager decides whether to implement an in-
formation system. However, once an implemented system has generated a signal,
the manager must truthfully share it with the predetermined group of users. The
assumption of truthful reporting can be motivated in several ways. First, the man-
ager may not be willing to bias the signal due to personal integrity or the threat
of litigation. The stringent rules for accountability and transparency after Dodd
Frank and the stronger internal control requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Section
404 leave less reporting discretion to managers. Second, in many cases, the signal
is verifiable. Lastly, the state of nature can be interpreted as the most informative
signal the manager can generate. Her choice of signal precision is then equivalent
to the choice of how much to garble information.
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This paper belongs to the persuasion literature. Its primary theoretical an-
tecedent is the Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). As
in Alonso and Camara (2014) and Wang (2013), this paper focuses on information
control with multiple receivers. Similar to Gentzkow and Kamenica (2013), the
model allows for persuasion to be costly.
A key application of my study is financial reporting to external users. Broadly
speaking, my paper is related to the literature on costs and benefits of information
dissemination, which is reviewed by Verrecchia (2001), Dye (2001), Beyer, Cohen,
Lys, and Walther (2010) and Stocken (2012). Prior literature on selective disclosure
considers models that focus on the ex post strategic communication between play-
ers with asymmetric information (e.g., cheap-talk and disclosure models). I assume
that the players have symmetric information and focus on the ex ante strategic con-
trol of the information environment at the information gathering stage. This allows
for identification of unintended consequences of regulations advocating comprehen-
sive information dissemination, e.g., Reg FD, which are qualitatively different from
the already studied effects driven by herding (e.g., Arya, Glover, Mittendorf and
Narayanamoorthy, 2005), externalities (e.g., Chen, Lewis and Zhang, 2013), users’
incentives to gather information (e.g., Jorgensen, Li and Melumad, 2013; Demski
and Feltham, 1994; Kim and Verrecchia, 1991; McNichols and Trueman, 1994),
price efficiency (Dutta, 1996) and private information sale (Bushman, 1991 and
Sabino, 1993). Studies that are more closely related to mine are Edmans, Heinle
and Huang (2013) and Gao and Liang (2013) because they consider ex ante com-
mitment to dissemination policy. Edmans, Heinle and Huang (2013) consider real
effects and find that the optimal level of disclosure is a trade-off between the ben-
efits of disclosure (reduced cost of capital) and its costs (inefficient investment).
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In Gao and Liang (2013) the firm’s information precision is exogenous, and the
focus is on the informational feedback effect: a speculator can privately acquire
information that, once reflected in the stock price, can be used by the firm when
choosing an investment.
My paper is related to the literature that links ex ante information acquisition
and ex post communication strategic choices (e.g., Che and Kartik, 2009; Fischer
and Stocken, 2010; Hughes and Pae, 2004; Pae, 1999). In these studies, a player
(e.g., advisor, analyst, entrepreneur) acquires information and then strategically
decides whether or how to communicate it to another player. Shavell (1994) com-
pares a seller’s incentives to acquire information under mandatory and voluntary
disclosure to buyers.
In my model, once the output of the information system is generated, the
manager must truthfully communicate it to the users. Hence my paper relates to
the literature that considers the firm’s choice of report precision that is publicly
disclosed to investors (e.g., Penno, 1996; Titman and Trueman, 1986). In my
study, the choice of information system is a strategic persuasion device for control
of information environment. In that sense, my paper also relates to the strand
of literature studying information system design as a commitment device (e.g.,
Baiman, 1975; Arya, Glover and Sivaramakrishnan, 1997).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes
the access to information and considers policy implications. Section 4 extends the
results to a setting in which persuasion is costly and discusses the socially optimal
fraction of informed users. Section 5 considers users’ bias. Section 6 concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
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2 Model Setup
I consider a firm manager and a group of individuals (labeled “users”) who are
interested in learning about the firm. There is a continuum of identical users
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. The users simultaneously take actions.
The payoff of user i depends on his own action ai ∈ R and the state of nature of
the firm ω ∈ Ω ∈ R (for example, economic earnings):
u(ai, ω) = −(ai − ω)2,
where Ω is a finite set. In the leading example, ai represents the individual ana-
lyst’s forecast. For any realization of the state of nature, the interior solution that
maximizes the payoff of user i is
a∗(ω) ∈ arg max
ai
u(ai, ω) = ω, (1)
i.e., a representative user prefers an action that is fully aligned with the state of
nature. In the leading example from the introduction this assumption reflects the
fact that analysts care about their reputation for accuracy.9





9Analysts might be upward biased in good states and downward biased in bad states to amplify
the trading volume. Allowing for different sensitivity to the state of nature of the users’ bliss
point will not change the results qualitatively as long as the users’ preferred actions are more
sensitive to the state of nature than the manager’s preferred aggregate action.
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and on the state of nature ω and is denoted by:
v(A, ω) = −(A− kω − (1− k)ω)2,
where k ∈ (0, 1) and ω ∈ R are parameters. The assumption that the manager’s
payoff is affected by the aggregate actions of all users is a key feature of the model
and is motivated by the fact that in many cases the users are atomistic, i.e., the
actions of a single user do not affect the firm’s wealth. In the leading example,
A represents the consensus analysts’ forecast. For any realization of the state of
nature, the interior solution that maximizes the manager’s payoff is
A∗(ω) ∈ arg max
A
v(A, ω) = kω + (1− k)ω. (2)
The manager prefers an aggregate action that is partially aligned with the state
of nature ω and partially biased toward some exogenous value ω.10 In the leading
example, this assumption reflects the fact that the manager may want a consensus
forecast that is less sensitive to the economic earnings and is biased toward a
specific forecast that maximizes the manager’s compensation.11 I refer to k as the
10A similar preference was introduced in a cheap talk setting by Melumad and Shibano (1991)
and by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) in their lobbying example of a Bayesian persuasion game.
In Melumad and Shibano (1991), the communication game is affected by preference reversal, i.e.,
the bliss point of the manager can be lower or higher than the bliss point of the user in different
environments. In my model, although preference reversal is possible depending on the relative
magnitude of ω vis-a-vis ω, it does not affect the persuasion game. As I show, by implementing
an information system and limiting access to information, the manager can persuade the users to
take an aggregate action that is closer to kω but cannot persuade them to take an action closer
to (1− k)ω.
11The standard view would be that this preferred forecast is high so that it increases the stock
price and the manager’s stock-based compensation. However, it could also be a low forecast (to
trigger low exercise price before option grant date) or a mean forecast (that is easy to meet or
beat).
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measure of “preference alignment” between the manager and a representative user.
As k → 1, the players’ preferences are perfectly aligned because then the manager,
just like the users, prefers an action that is fully aligned with the state of nature.
None of the players observes the state of nature ω. I assume that ω is dis-
tributed according to some (commonly known) probability distribution πo ∈ ∆(Ω)
with mean µ0 ≡ E[ω] and variance V ar(ω).12 The manager can implement an in-
formation system that will provide a noisy signal s ∈ Ω ∈ R of the state of nature.13
In the basic setting, the information system implementation is cost-free. This as-
sumption is relaxed in Section 4. Each signal realization leads to a posterior belief
B ∈ ∆(Ω). An information system creates a (commonly known) distribution over
posterior beliefs π ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)). Throughout the paper I refer to π as the design of
the information system. Let supp(π) ⊆ ∆(Ω) be the set of all possible posteriors.




Let Π(π0) denote the set of all Bayes-plausible information systems. Then,
Π(π0) =
{





Note that Π(π0) includes an information system with s = ω, i.e., such that perfectly
reveals the state of nature. For the reminder of the paper I will refer to such system
as “fully revealing” or “perfectly informative”.
12This rules out distributions with undefined mean and variance, e.g., Cauchy distribution.
13For example, managers hire economists to provide forecasts, purchase inventory management
software, pay for appraisals to assess the value of the firm’s long-lived assets, etc.
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To analyze the effects of the ability (or lack thereof) of the manager to limit ac-
cess to information, I compare two alternative regimes: “mandatory dissemination”
(hereafter, “MD”) and “unregulated dissemination” (hereafter, “UD”). Under MD
the manager is required to disclose the same signal to all users, while under UD the
manager can choose the fraction x ∈ [0, 1] of users who will observe the signal.14 I
refer to those users as “informed” and to the rest of the users as “uninformed.” In
other words, ex ante identical users become heterogeneous endogenously by virtue
of selective information dissemination. Observability of x is irrelevant for the anal-
ysis because, by assumption, each user only cares about his own action.
I restrict attention to cases in which the signal is truthfully communicated to the
informed users. This assumption reflects the litigation threat in case of concealing
or distorting information. In my model, the users do not gather information on their
own. This assumption is motivated by the fact that, in many cases, firm managers
have access to sources of information unavailable to the users. In the leading
example, only the firm manager (and not the analyst) can gather information
about within-firm determinants of economic earnings, e.g., production capacity
and inventory levels.15 Furthermore, the users cannot contract on the information
system design because they are many and small in size. The informed users have
no (strict) incentive to communicate their information to the uninformed users,
because the payoff of each user is affected only by his own action.16 The uninformed
users cannot infer the signal realization from the actions of the informed users before
14Alternatively, x can be interpreted as the probability that user i observes the signal.
15An additional motivation to focus solely on the information gathered by managers is that
prior literature has analyzed the effects of selective disclosure on the incentives of the users to
acquire information on their own (Jorgensen, Li and Melumad, 2011).















Figure 1: Timeline of events
choosing their actions, because all actions are taken simultaneously.
Figure 1 shows the timeline of the events. At date 1, the manager chooses the
design of information system π and the fraction x of informed users (under UD).
At date 2, the information system reveals signal s to the fraction x of informed
users. At date 3, the users take actions, and, at date 4, the payoffs are realized.
3 Access to Information
I solve the model by backward induction. To avoid confusion I use a subscript t = 1
for the expectation operator to denote the expectation at date 1 over the random
variables ω and s and a subscript t = 3 to denote the posterior expectation at date
3 of ω after observing the realization of the signal s. At date 3, after observing the
choice of information system and the signal realization, the informed users form
Bayesian rational beliefs regarding the state of nature and, given the quadratic loss
nature of their payoff functions, take actions that equal the posterior expectation:
â(s, π) ≡ arg max
ai
Et=3[u(ai, ω)|s, π] = Et=3[ω|s, π] (3)
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To avoid clutter I denote µs,π ≡ Et=3[ω|s, π]. Lacking information, the uninformed
users take actions that equal the prior expectation:
â(∅) ≡ arg max
ai
Et=3[u(ai, ω)|∅] = Et=3[ω] = µ0. (4)
As a result, the aggregate action of the users at date 3 is a weighted average of the
posterior (for the informed users) and the prior (for the uninformed users):






â(∅)di = xµs,π + (1− x)µ0. (5)
Then, the expected payoff of the manager at date 1 is given by
V (x, π) ≡ Et=1[v(Â(x, s, π), ω)].
Firm managers choose the precision of the information system that they im-
plement, but they cannot always choose the fraction of users who observe the
information. For example, even when regulators gravitate to rules that ensure
equal access to information, not all users may observe the available information for
various exogenous reasons. It is therefore useful to consider, as a benchmark, the
case of exogenous fraction of informed users. At date 1, the manager chooses the









By implementing an information system the manager “persuades” the users,
i.e., she convinces the users to take actions that are closer to her preferred actions
and differ from the actions the users would have taken without the information.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) find that a sender–in my model, the manager–
benefits from persuading a single user if her expected payoff is convex in the user’s
beliefs regarding the state of nature of the firm. Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 translate
this result to my setting and extend it to multiple users, a fraction x of whom are
informed for exogenous reasons.
Lemma 1 Suppose x ∈ [0, 1] is exogenously given. If k > x2 (k ≤
x
2 ) the man-
ager’s ex-ante payoff increases (decreases) in the variance of the users’ posterior
expectation µs,π.
Corollary 1 The manager implements a perfectly revealing information system if
and only if k > x2 . Otherwise, she does not implement an information system.
The formal proofs are omitted as they follow from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
and the discussion below. Note that at date 3, after observing the signal, the
manager and the users share the same beliefs. Then, by the Law of Iterated Ex-
pectations, the manager’s expected payoff at date 1 can be conveniently presented
15
as:
V (x, π) = Et=1
 Et=3[v(Â(x, s, π), ω)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior expectation at date 3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
expectation over signal realizations at date 1
= Et=1[Et=3[−(xµs,π + (1− x)µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω)2]]
= Et=1[Et=3[−(xµs,π − kω)2]]













µ20 + V ar(ω)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 2 = const
− [(x− 2k + 1)µ0 − (1− k)ω][(1− x)µ0 − (1− k)ω]︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 3 = const
. (6)
The second and third terms in (6) are constant across signal realizations, s. How-
ever, term 1 depends on the posterior expectation that a signal induces, and the
manager can control its magnitude by choosing the information system. Noting
that term 1 is an expectation of a quadratic function of the random variable µs,π



















µ20 ≤ 0 if k < x2 .
If the preferences of the manager are sufficiently aligned with those of the users
(k > x2 ), then the manager’s payoff is convex in µs,π, and the manager is better
off inducing a nontrivial posterior expectation than leaving the users with their
prior expectation. The opposite logic holds when the preferences of the manager
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are sufficiently misaligned with those of the users (k < x2 ). To gain further insight
note that using (6),













(V ar(µs,π) + µ20) + const,
where V ar(µs,π) is the variance of the posterior expectation. When the preferences
of the players are aligned (k > x2 ), the manager wants to induce as much variance as
possible, which she achieves by implementing the most informative system. Under
the specific assumptions of the model this system is fully revealing.17 The opposite
is true when the preferences of the players are misaligned (k ≤ x2 ). The manager
then minimizes the variance by not implementing information system.18 In the
knife-edge case, when k = x2 , the manager’s expected payoff is the same regardless
of the variance in posterior expectation that she induces. For the remainder of the
paper, I assume that, whenever the manager is indifferent, she does not implement
an information system.
As a next step, I consider the manager’s ability to control the aggregate infor-
mation flow by limiting access to information of a subset of users. To do so, I relax
the assumption that x is exogenously given and let the manager choose not only
the information system precision but also the fraction of informed users (regime
UD). At date 1, the full-fledged optimization problem of the manager is
17To see why note that, by the Law of Total Variance, V ar(µs,π) = V ar(ω)−Et=3[V ar(ω|s)].
Hence, V ar(µs,π) ∈ [0, V ar(ω)] and achieves maximum when the information system is fully
revealing (if s = ω, then Et=3[V ar(ω|s)] = 0).









Let (x̂, π̂) denote the solution to this program. Simplifying, the expected utility of
the manager can be presented as:
V (x, π) = Et=1[−(xµs,π + (1− x)µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω)2]
= −V ar (xµs,π + (1− x)µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω)
− (Et=1 [xµs,π + (1− x)µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω])2
= −V ar(xµs,π − kω)− (1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2.
Given that −(1 − k)2(µ0 − ω)2 is constant in x and π, maximizing V (x, π) boils
down to minimizing V ar(xµs,π − kω) = Et=1[(xµs,π − kω)2]− (x− k)2µ20.
Proposition 1 Under UD, for any k, it is optimal for the manager to implement
an information system that perfectly reveals the state of nature to a fraction x̂ = k
of users.
The driving force behind this result is that V (x) ≡ V (x, π̂(x)) is single peaked at
x = k. Proposition 1 implies that the manager finds it optimal to restrict access to
information.19 To better understand the intuition, recall that the aggregate action
19Allowing for different sensitivity of a representative user’s bliss point to the state of nature
does not change this result qualitatively as long as the manager prefers smoother aggregate
action across states. Under this scenario the optimal fraction of informed users equals the ratio
of the sensitivities of the manager’s and a representative user’s bliss points. Proof available upon
request.
18
of the users at date 3 is as stated in equation (5):
Â(x, s, π) = xµs,π + (1− x)µ0,
while the manager would want it to be as close as possible to her bliss point as
stated in equation (2):
A∗(ω) = kω + (1− k)ω,
for any realization of ω. The objective of the manager is to minimize the difference
between Â(x, s, π) and A∗(ω). By acquiring information about ω, the manager
cannot control the difference between (1−x)µ0 and (1−k)ω. But she can minimize
the difference between xµs,π and kω. Implementing a partially informative system
and providing the information to more users will change the term xµs,π into an
ex ante (at date 1) unknown direction. By implementing a perfectly informative
system and revealing the signal to exactly a fraction k of users, the manager controls
xµs,π and makes sure that ex-post it is exactly kω.
Put differently, if the state of nature were observable, the manager would want
the users to react to the realization of ω with a response coefficient of k (as, by
(2), dA∗(ω)
dω
= k). In the model, the users only get to see the signal, s, and not the
state, ω, directly. In order to regulate the sensitivity with which the users react






, the manager has two
instruments at her disposal: π, which determines the response coefficient dâ(s,π)
ds
for an informed user, and x, which determines the fraction of informed users.20
One way to implement an expected response coefficient of k is to set x = 1 and
20The uninformed users, by default, have response coefficient dâ(∅)ds = 0.
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π (calculated as a plug) that ensures dâ(s,π)
ds
= k. This, however, introduces noise
into the signal, which is costly to the users and to the manager. Alternatively, the
manager can set x = k and implement a perfectly informative information system.
This would yield the same response coefficient in expectation but avoids the noise
in the signal, which makes this the optimal solution.
Note that, by Proposition 1, when the manager is allowed to choose the group
of informed users, she always finds it optimal to implement an information system,
regardless of the preference misalignment between the players. This result is in
stark contrast to the result for exogenously given fraction of informed users in
Corollary 1. Technically speaking, this difference arises because the expected payoff
of the manager at the optimal fraction x̂ = k is always convex in the users’ beliefs.
Therefore, as described in the discussion following Lemma 1, the manager benefits
from introducing variance in the posterior beliefs and maximizes this variance by
sending a signal that perfectly reveals the state of nature.
The intuition behind this result is that the choice of x is a tool that regulates
the flow of information and enables the manager to persuade the users to take
an aggregate action that is as close as possible to her most preferred action. In
other words, the ability to limit access to information mitigates the reluctance
to implement an information system due to preference misalignment between the
players. As a result, the manager always finds it optimal to implement a system
that releases a perfectly informative signal to the optimally chosen fraction of users.
Regulators often gravitate to rules that ensure equal access to information for
all agents in an economy. To consider the implications of such rules, I compare
two alternative regimes: mandated dissemination (MD), under which the manager
20
is required to disclose information to all users, i.e., x = 1 is exogenously set,21 and
unregulated dissemination (UD), under which the manager can optimally choose
the fraction of informed users in her own best interest.
Proposition 2
(i) If k ≤ 12 , UD Pareto dominates MD.
(ii) If k > 12 , the manager is better off under UD, but all users are at least weakly
better off under MD.
The formal proof is omitted as it follows from the discussion below. Under UD,
the manager can choose any fraction x ∈ [0, 1], but she finds it optimal to limit
access to information to some users (i.e., sets x̂ = k < 1). Hence, by revealed
preference, she always prefers UD over MD. The users’ preference is less obvious.
At the heart of the comparison lie the observations that, whenever the manager
chooses to implement an information system, she implements a fully informative
one and that, given their quadratic loss payoff, the users benefit from fully revealing
information.
By Corollary 1 and Proposition 1, if k ≤ 12 , then the manager implements an
information system only under UD. The informed users are better off under UD
(because it is the only regime under which the manager implements an information
system). The uninformed users are indifferent (because they do not observe in-
formation under either regime). As a result, UD Pareto dominates MD. However,
if k > 12 , the manager implements a perfectly revealing information system under
both regimes. The informed users are indifferent (because they perfectly observe
21In many cases, even if the regulator sets x = 1, the actual fraction of informed users is strictly
lower as some users will not observe the information (for example, unsophisticated investors).
Considering this possibility does not change qualitatively the results.
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ω under both regimes), while the users who are uninformed under UD are better
off under MD (because it allows them to observe information).
Paradoxically, Proposition 2 shows that, when the players preferences over the
actions are misaligned, their preferences over regimes are aligned, and vice versa.
If regulators believe that firm managers and users have very different objectives,
then by part (i), they should gravitate to UD, because it Pareto dominates MD. If
k > 12 , Pareto ranking of the regimes is not possible, but MD ensures all users are
at least weakly better off. Hence, if regulators care exclusively about the welfare of
the users and believe the objectives of the managers and the users are sufficiently
aligned, they should gravitate to MD.
The result of Proposition 2 may be surprising at first, because conventional
wisdom would say that, if the preferences of the players are misaligned, then there
is need for the regulator to intervene as players will not arrive at a socially effi-
cient result on their own, and vice versa. However, my model predicts exactly the
opposite–the regulator’s intervention when the players objectives are misaligned
may suppress socially beneficial information acquisition.
A natural question that arises is what is the socially optimal fraction of informed
users. I examine this question in subsection 4.4 after I extend the model to account
for costly information system implementation.
4 Costly Persuasion
In Section 3, the information system under MD has a bang-bang character. This
result does not seem particularly descriptive. Therefore, in this section, I extend
the results by introducing a cost borne by the manager associated with the imple-
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mentation of the information system.22 I show that when implementation is costly
the manager sacrifices some amount of precision, and, under standard regularity
conditions, her choice is an interior solution. This allows (i) for analyzing how the
ability of the manager to limit access to information affects the information system
and (ii) for providing new predictions.
To keep the analysis tractable, I impose normality on the distributions of ω and
s for the remainder of the paper:





, α ≥ 0;





, β ≥ 0.
The error terms ε and δ are independent:
Cov(ε, δ) = 0.
Upon observing the signal realization, the players form a posterior belief re-









Under these assumptions, the manager’s choice of a Bayes-plausible distribution π
over posterior beliefs simplifies to a choice of β, which represents the precision of
the signal. A choice of β → 0 means the signal does not convey any information,
22Information system implementation costs are frequently observed in practice. For example,
providing a forecast requires hiring an economist, inventory management requires purchasing
software, evaluating an asset’s fair value requires paying for an appraisal, etc.
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while a choice of β →∞ indicates a signal that fully reveals the realization of ω.23
The manager’s choice of β is observed by the users.24 The prior expectation of the
state of nature µ0 and the variance 1α are common knowledge.
Under the normality assumption at date 3 the informed users take actions
â(s, β) = µs,β = αµ0+βsα+β . The expected utility of the manager at date 1 can be
presented as:
V (x, β) = Et=1[−(xµs,β + (1− x)µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω)2]
= −Et=1
(x(ε+ δ) β




α + β − kε
)2− (1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2 (7)
I assume that the manager bears an implementation cost C(c, β) with
Cc(.) ≥ 0, Cβ(.) ≥ 0, Ccc(.) ≥ 0, Cββ(.) ≥ 0, Ccβ(.) > 0.
The parameter c > 0 represents the cost of information system technology in the
economy and might be a function of the level of competition in that market. I
assume c is exogenously given and refer to it as the “information cost” or just
“cost.” To ensure interior solutions I assume that
lim
β→∞
Cβ(c, β)→∞ and lim
β→0
Cβ(c, β) = 0
23I do not restrict the precision of the information system, i.e., I assume the manager can
implement a fully revealing information system. In many settings there could be an upper bound
β ∈ (0,∞) on the precision.
24For example, the hire of an economist, the choice of inventory management software, etc.,
are often publicly observable, and their precision is commonly known.
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for any cost.25 The total implementation cost is zero whenever information is
cost-free or information system is completely imprecise, i.e.,
lim
c→0
C(c, β) = lim
β→0
C(c, β) = 0.
Lastly, it seems realistic to think that, once the information system is implemented,
the associated cost is independent of the fraction of users observing the signal.
Assuming otherwise, i.e., that the implementation cost is increasing in the number
of the users to which the signal is conveyed (which is the reasonable alternative
assumption), would only mechanically facilitate finding that it is optimal for the
manager to restrict access to information without qualitatively changing the results.
4.1 The Optimal Precision
Similar to the analysis with cost-free implementation, I start by considering the
manager’s problem when x ∈ [0, 1] is exogenously given. Let
∆x ≡ |x− k|
denote the distance between the fraction of informed users and the preference
misalignment. At date 1, the manager chooses
βc(x) ∈ arg max
β
V (x, β)− C(c, β), (8)
25This is the case for many commonly used cost functions, including the quadratic cost func-
tion cβ
2
2 as a special case. All results hold qualitatively with few minor adjustments for cost
functions with limβ→0 Cβ(c, β) > 0 (linear cost function cβ as a special case), i.e., for which the
marginal cost from implementing a system with even very small precision is positive. Whenever
applicable, I will outline in a footnote the minor adjustments needed under the assumption that
limβ→0 Cβ(c, β) > 0. Full analysis available upon request.
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where the superscript “c” denotes costly information system implementation.26
Lemma 2 Suppose x ∈ [0, 1] is exogenously given and the manager bears an im-
plementation cost C(c, β). The manager then implements an information system
with precision βc(x) ∈ (0,∞) if and only if k > x2 . β
c(x) is decreasing in c and in
∆x and increasing in 1
α
and in k.
Similar to the results in Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 for cost-free implementation,
the manager implements an information system if and only if her preferences are
sufficiently aligned with those of the users.27 The cutoff for implementation (k > x2 )
does not depend on the cost. If c → 0, then βc(x) → ∞ and therefore the results
from the preceding section are recouped as a special case. However, as long as
c > 0, the manager finds it optimal to sacrifice some precision. The higher the
cost, the less precise the information system that the manager implements. In the
limit, as c → ∞, βc(x) → 0, i.e., if the implementation is extremely costly, the
signal will be uninformative.
The closer the exogenous fraction x to the preference alignment k, the higher
the precision of the information system that the manager implements. This is
graphically shown in Figure 2. The intuition for this result is that, when x = k, the
players’ preference misalignment is minimized, and this provides stronger incentives
for the manager to gather information. The more aligned the manager’s preferences
with those of the users, the more precise the information system she implements, so
that the users’ actions will be more in line with the realization of ω. This intuition
26The optimal precision βc(x) depends, in addition to x, on other exogenous parameters c, α
and k. I depress them to avoid clutter.
27If limβ→0 Cβ(c, β) > 0, i.e., if the implementation of an information system with even very
small precision is costly, then the manager will implement an information system only if c is below
a certain threshold. It can be shown that the threshold is decreasing in ∆x. Analysis available
upon request.
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Figure 2: Optimal precision as a function of x
Numerical example with C(c, β) = cβ
2
2 , α = 1, c = 0.2, k = 0.3
is shown graphically in Figure 3. As shown in Lemma 2, the signal precision is










Figure 3: Optimal precision as a function of k
Numerical example with C(c, β) = cβ
2
2 , c = 0.2, x = 0.4
increasing in 1
α
, the prior variance of ω. Further, the optimal precision does not
depend on ω. This confirms the previously noted observation that the manager
cannot persuade the users to take an action close to ω.
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As a next step, I consider the ability of the manager to limit access to infor-
mation to a subset of users by optimally choosing x. At date 1, the manager’s




V (x, β)− C(c, β). (9)
Let (xcUD, βcUD) denote the solution to this program. The result below extends
Proposition 1 to the costly implementation setting.
Proposition 3 Suppose the manager bears an implementation cost C(c, β). Under
UD, for any k, it is optimal for the manager to implement an information system
with precision βcUD ≡ βc(x = k) and to disseminate the signal to a fraction xcUD = k
of informed users.
The key finding here is that the optimal subset of informed users is unaffected by
the cost. The choice of x is a device that induces the right aggregate signal-response
coefficient of k, and that logic is unaffected by any implementation costs. However,
when implementation is costly, the manager implements an information system
that provides a noisy signal. The comparative statics of the optimal precision with
respect to 1
α
, c, k and ω are similar in nature to those of βc(x).
4.2 Regime Preferences
Straightforward application of Lemma 2 reveals that under MD the manager im-
plements an information system with precision
βcMD ≡ βc(x = 1) > 0
28
if k > 12 and zero otherwise. By Lemma 2, the information system implemented
under UD is more precise than the one implemented under MD:
∆β ≡ βcUD − βcMD > 0. (10)
Similar to the cost-free setting, the manager always prefers (by revealed pref-
erence) UD, and the uninformed users are always weakly better off under MD.28
However, the comparison with regards to the informed users is more complicated
and requires taking into account that the equilibrium precisions under both regimes
are different as shown in (10) and that the users want as precise information as
possible. The analysis shows that the informed users are always strictly better off
under UD, because it ensures they observe a more precise signal. The result below
extends Proposition 2 to the costly implementation setting.
Proposition 4 Suppose the manager bears an implementation cost C(c, β).
(i) If k ≤ 12 , UD Pareto dominates MD.
(ii) If k > 12 , the uninformed users are strictly better off under MD, while the
informed users and the manager are strictly better off under UD.
As before, if k ≤ 12 , UD Pareto dominates MD. Hence, if regulators believe the
preferences of firm managers and users in an economy are sufficiently misaligned,
they should not enforce equal access to information of all potential users. If k > 12 ,
there is an additional dimension to the disagreement issue discussed in the cost-free
setting, because now even the different types of users, endogenously divided into
informed and uninformed ones, prefer different regimes.
28If k > 12 , it is the only regime that enables them to observe a signal, while if k ≤
1
2 , then
they are indifferent because they do not observe a signal under either regime.
29
4.3 Welfare Analysis with Sufficiently Aligned Preferences
Proposition 4 shows that, when the preferences of the players are sufficiently
aligned, neither of the regimes ensures all users are at least weakly better off simul-
taneously. In this subsection, I conduct welfare analysis to evaluate under which
regime the users are better off at an aggregate level when k > 12 . Let
φc(x) ≡ Et=1 [u(â(s|βc(x)), ω)]− Et=1 [u(â(∅), ω)]





Et=1 [u(â(s|βc(x)), ω)] di+
∫ 1
x








= Et=1 [u(â(∅), ω)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
base welfare
+ xφc(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate gain
(11)
is the aggregate users’ welfare.29 The base welfare represents the aggregate payoff
of all users when the manager does not implement an information system. The
aggregate gain is the information gain of the informed users, on an aggregate level.
While the base welfare is independent of x, the comparative statics of the aggregate
gain with respect to x is a priori unclear. As seen from (11), there are two effects:
(i) a direct effect–as x increases, more users benefit from information, and (ii) an
indirect effect–the fraction x affects the information gain indirectly through the
optimal precision.
29The gain φc(x) and the aggregate welfare W c(x) depend, in addition to x, on other exogenous
parameters: c, α and k. I depress them to avoid clutter.
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Corollary 2 φc(x) is decreasing in ∆x ≡ |x− k|.
The intuition behind this result is that the information gain is increasing in the
precision, which is single-peaked at x = k by Lemma 2. As a result, the informed
users are better off when the manager discloses information only to a fraction
k of users. Equation (11) and Corollary 2 imply that broader dissemination of
information is not always better for the users on an aggregate level. To compare
the users’ welfare under both regimes, let
φcMD ≡ φc(x = 1)
φcUD ≡ φc(x = k)
denote the information gain of a representative informed user and
W cMD ≡ W c(x = 1)
W cUD ≡ W c(x = k)
the aggregate welfare of the users under MD and UD, respectively. Comparing UD
and MD on an aggregate level requires signing the welfare differential
∆W ≡ W cUD −W cMD = kφcUD︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate gain UD
− φcMD︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate gain MD
The comparison of the aggregate gains is affected by two countervailing effects:
(i) an omission effect–under UD, the proportion of informed users is lower than
the proportion under MD (xcUD = k < 1)–and (ii) a precision effect–by Lemma 2,
the signal precision under UD is higher than the one under MD. As a result, by
31
Corollary 2, the information gain under UD is larger than the one under MD:
∆φ ≡ φcUD − φcMD > 0. (12)
The next result presents sufficient conditions for the aggregate welfare under UD
to exceed the one under MD.
Proposition 5 Suppose k > 12 and the manager bears an implementation cost
C(c, β) = cβ22 . Then there exist k̃ ∈ (
1
2 , 1), such that W
c
UD ≥ W cMD if k ≤ k̃, and c
is sufficiently high.
This result is graphically shown in Figure 4. As c → 0, the manager sets the
same (infinite) precision under UD and MD. Hence the gain from information of a
representative informed user under both regimes is the same, and ∆W ∝ k−1 < 0
so that the users prefer MD, in aggregate. As c increases, the optimal precision
and, as a result, the respective aggregate gain decrease. As c→∞, the aggregate
gain under both regimes reaches zero. However, as I show in the proof, the gain
under MD does so faster than the one under UD if the preference alignment is
sufficiently bounded away from one.30 As a result, for some sufficiently high cost,
the aggregate gain under MD is larger than the aggregate gain under UD.
Another way to look at the efficiency effects of the manager’s ability to limit
access to information is by considering the accuracy of the aggregate users’ action,
i.e., the distance between the aggregate action and the state of nature. In the
leading example, this reflects the accuracy of the consensus forecast, observed by
30When the preference alignment is sufficiently close to one, the aggregate gains under both
regimes are of similar magnitude and decrease in c at the same rate.
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Figure 4: Users’ welfare comparison
Numerical example with C(c, β) = cβ
2
2 , α = 1, k = 0.55
investors.31 It can be shown that the conditions ensuring users are better off, on
an aggregate level, under UD are sufficient for the aggregate action to be more
accurate.32
4.4 Regulated Information Dissemination
I conclude the analysis by discussing the socially optimal fraction of informed users.
To do so, I assume that a benevolent regulator (“he”) chooses the subset of users
who get to observe the signal prior to the manager’s choice of information system
and call this regime regulated dissemination (“RD”). The regulator chooses x to
maximize the aggregate expected payoffs of all players, subject to the constraint
31Earnings forecasts are a main source of earnings information of many investors. Brown and
Rozeff (1978); Fried and Givoly (1982); Givoly and Lakonishok (1984); Conroy and Harris (1987);
Brown, Hagerman, Griffin and Zmijewski (1987); O’Brien (1988); Kross, Ro and Schroeder (1990)
show that forecasts are a good proxy for investors’ earnings expectations.
32The proof is available upon request.
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that the information system precision is chosen by the manager in her own interest:
max
x∈[0,1]
λ[V (x, βc(x))− C(c, βc(x))] +W c(x)
subject to βc(x) ≡ arg max
β
V (x, β)− C(c, β).
The parameter λ ≥ 0 represents the weight that the regulator puts on the manager’s
welfare. It is straightforward that, if the regulator cares only about the manager’s
welfare (i.e., λ → ∞), he will choose the same fraction of informed users that the
manager would have set in her own interest (xcRD = k). However, if the regulator
sufficiently cares about the users’ welfare, the socially beneficial level of x may go
beyond k and, under certain conditions, may even reach one.
Lemma 3 Suppose λ ≤ 1 and the manager bears an implementation cost C(c, β) =
cβ2
2 with c ≥ 0. Then the socially beneficial fraction of informed users x
c
RD ∈ [k, 1]
is decreasing in c.
When the players’ preferences are sufficiently misaligned, the regulator wants to
restrict access to information for some users even when he does not care at all about
the manager’s welfare (i.e., λ = 0), because he wants to ensure the manager has
incentives to implement an information system and disseminate socially valuable
information.33 However, when the players preferences are sufficiently aligned and
information acquisition is cost-free, the regulator chooses a corner solution for x
and enforces equal access to information. The rationale behind this observation
is that when c → 0 the gain in collective users’ welfare is larger than the loss in
33If k ≤ 12 , then 2k ≤ 1. To ensure that the manager implements an information system, the
planner needs to make sure that x < 2k ≤ 1. This observation confirms the result in Proposition
4 (i).
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manager’s payoff caused by increasing x beyond k.34 Introduction of costs changes
the corner solution character of the socially beneficial fraction of informed users.
Put differently, unlike the fraction of informed users set by the manager in her own
interest, the fraction x that the regulator enforces is decreasing in the implementa-
tion cost. The reason for this finding is that, as c increases, the manager chooses a
lower precision. Then, to provide incentives for the manager to increase the preci-
sion of the socially valuable information, even the users themselves, at some prior
state, would collectively agree to some x < 1, as long as they are behind the veil
of ignorance (Harsanyi, 1955), i.e., before each learns whether he will be included
in the group of informed users.
5 Biased Users of Information
In Section 3 and Section 4 the users of information are unbiased as they prefer
actions that are fully aligned with the state of nature of the firm. However, the users
can sometimes be cautious (aggressive) and take actions that are lower (higher)
than the state of nature of the firm. In the leading example, analysts compensation
and reputation may be more severely hurt in the case of an upward forecast error
than in the case of a downward one. This may provide incentives to the analysts
to be more conservative in their forecasts.
I now consider how the introduction of bias in the users’ preferences affects the
34When k > 12 , the implementation constraint is satisfied for any x, and with c = 0 the manager
implements a perfectly revealing information system. Hence the derivative of the regulator’s
objective function with respect to x reads 2λ(k−x)α +
1
α . If x < k both terms are positive, i.e.,
all players benefit from increasing x. If x > k, then the first term is negative and represents the
decrease in manager’s payoff from increasing the fraction of informed users beyond k. The second
term represents the gain in aggregate users’ welfare from an increase in x. If λ ≤ 1 and k > 12 ,
then 2λ(k−x)+1 > 2k−1 > 0, i.e., the gain in users’ welfare is larger than the loss in manager’s
payoff.
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prior results. I return to the assumptions maintained in Section 3: (i) the state of
nature of the firm is distributed according to some (commonly known) probability
distribution πo ∈ ∆(Ω), and (ii) the manager can implement a cost-free information
system that creates a (commonly known) distribution over posterior beliefs π ∈
∆(∆(Ω)). Under the assumption that the users are also biased, the parameter k
does not capture anymore the preference alignment between the players. Through
out this Section I will refer to k as “the manager’s bias”. The higher k the less
biased the manager.
If all users have identical bias then the results in Section 3 remain qualitatively
similar except that now the manager’s preference bias, k, is scaled by the respec-
tive users’ preference bias.35 The more interesting case is when the users’ bias is
heterogeneous. Given that in practice users tend to differ in their cautiousness (ag-
gressiveness) this scenario also seems to be the more realistic one. In the leading
example, this assumption will reflect the heterogeneity in analysts’ compensation
or sensitivity to reputation.
To analyze the effect of heterogeneous bias I sort the users by their respective
bias and assume that the ex post payoff of user i is given by:
uH(ai, ω) = −(ai − iω − (1− i)ω)2,
35To illustrate, suppose that the ex post payoff of a representative user is u(ai, ω) = −(ai− lω−
(1− l)ω)2, where l ∈ (0, 1) and ω ∈ R are commonly known parameters. Here, l captures the bias
of the users. The ratio kl represents the preference alignment between the players:
k
l → 1 indicates
that the preferences of the players are aligned, while kl < 1 (
k
l > 1) indicates that the manager
is more (less) biased than the users. Under UD, the manager implements a perfectly informative
information system and disseminates the signal to a fraction x = min{kl , 1} of informed users.
Put differently, the manager restricts the access to information only when she is more biased than
the users (i.e., when kl < 1). Otherwise, she publicly reveals the information. Detailed analysis
available upon request.
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where the superscript “H” denotes “heterogeneous bias”, ω ∈ R is a parameter and,
as before, i ∼ U [0, 1]. For any realization of ω, the interior solution that maximizes
the payoff of user i is:
a∗i (ω) ≡ arg maxai u
H(ai, ω) = iω + (1− i)ω,
i.e., user i prefers an action that is partially aligned with the state of nature of the
firm and partially biased towards a specific action ω. The higher i, the less biased
the user. In the limit, as i→ 1, user i becomes unbiased. At date 3, the informed
users take an action
âH(s, π) ≡ arg max
ai
Et=3[uH(ai, ω)|s, π] = iµs,π + (1− i)ω
and the uninformed users take an action
âH(∅) ≡ arg max
ai
Et=3[uH(ai, ω)|∅] = iµ0 + (1− i)ω.
Let [x, x] with 0 ≤ x ≤ x ≤ 1 represent the partition of users that become in-
formed.36 In the following, I will refer to
∫ x
x i di as the “aggregate bias of the
informed users.” The aggregate action is










= (µs,π − µ0)
∫ x
x




36In the formal analysis I restrict attention to compact intervals of informed users. However,
as I will discuss later, the manager cannot increase her payoff by disseminating information to a
non-compact subset of users.
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and the manager’s expected payoff can be presented as
V H(x, x, π) ≡ Et=1[v(AH(x, x, s, π), ω)].








0 ≤ x ≤ x ≤ 1.
The result below extends the results of Proposition 1 to the case when the users of
information differ in their bias.
Proposition 6 Under UD, the manager implements a perfectly revealing informa-
tion system.
(i) If k < 12 , the manager restricts access to information. There exist a con-
tinuum [x, x + f(x)] ⊂ [0, 1] that achieves the same maximum payoff to the
manager. The function f(x) is decreasing in x and increasing in k.
(ii) If k ≥ 12 , the manager publicly disseminates the signal.
If the state of nature of the firm were observable, the manager would want the users
to react to the realization of ω with a response coefficient of k. However, the users








To regulate the users’ sensitivity the manager implements a perfectly informative
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system (so that dµs,β
ds







i di︸ ︷︷ ︸
informed users’ aggregate bias
(14)
Put differently, the manager chooses the group of informed users so that their
aggregate bias is aligned with her own bias.37 If the manager is severely biased
(k < 12), there are different subsets of users with such aggregate bias.
38 If k = 12 ,
the manager disseminates globally because her preferences are perfectly aligned
with the aggregate bias of all existing users.39 If the manager is mildly biased
(k > 12), then she is more biased than the existing users, collectively. Therefore,
she wants to reveal the signal to as many users as possible. The best she can do is
to disseminate the signal globally.40
It is useful to consider the comparative statics of the size of the fraction of
informed users, represented by f(x), for a given x. When the least biased informed
user is only mildly biased (i.e., when x is low), the manager disseminates the signal
to fewer users.41 The intuition behind this result is that less biased users react with
higher sensitivity to the signal and the manager needs fewer users “in the loop” to
37To do so, the manager need not restrict herself only to a compact subset of users. However,
any non-compact subset of users that achieves an aggregate sensitivity of k will lead to the same
maximum payoff to the manager.
38If k < 12 , there are multiple (x, x) that satisfy (14).
39When k = 12 , only x = 0 and x = 1 satisfy (14).
40If k > 12 , condition (14) can not be satisfied for any x ≥ 0 and x ≤ 1 because, by assumption,
0 ≤ x ≤ x ≤ 1, so the right hand side of (14),
∫ x
x
i di = (x
2−x2)
2 , cannot be larger than
1
2 .
41An alternative interpretation of f(x) is the dispersion of bias within the group of informed
users. Then, when the least biased informed user is not very biased, the manager disseminates
to users with more aligned preferences.
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achieve the desired sensitivity of the average action. Not surprisingly, the fraction
of informed users is increasing in k, i.e., the more biased the manager, the more
she restricts the access to information.
6 Concluding Remarks
The results in this paper call into doubt the commonly held belief that firms should
grant unrestricted access to information to all interested parties. I find that, when
firms can selectively disseminate information, they may gather more precise in-
formation. Ironically, when the incentive conflict between managers and users is
sufficiently severe, leveling the playing field leads to less aggregate information in
the marketplace.
A key application of my model is information dissemination by managers to
analysts. However, the model can be applied to other settings in which one party
can gather information that is relevant for the decisions of others (for example,
a CFO who implements an information system that provides decision-facilitating
information to divisional managers).
The paper assumes truthful communication of information, which seems to
fit well the stringent reporting environment after Dodd Frank and the internal
control requirements after Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404. It offers potential for future
research of related questions. For example, I assume that the manager’s choice of
precision is observable. This may not always be the case. If the payoff function
of the manager is commonly known, then the users can conjecture the manager’s
choice in which case the equilibrium described in this paper persist (although,
perhaps, not unique anymore). However, if the players’ preference misalignment
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is unknown, then the users will evaluate the expected state of nature using a
conjecture of the manager’s precision that is based on expectation of the preference
misalignment. Future work may analyze several questions that arise. For example,
will the manager find it optimal to disclose her precision choice as a signal of her
preference misalignment and, if so, how will this affect the equilibrium?
Moreover, this paper assumes that the users take their actions simultaneously.
As a result, the uninformed users cannot update their beliefs about the state of
nature by observing the informed users’ actions. Future work can introduce noise
into the users’ actions and examine the effects of herding between users.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that V (x) ≡ V (x, π̂(x)) is single-peaked at x = k.
To see this start with x = k. By Lemma 1, the manager implements a perfectly
revealing information system so that µs,π = ω, Â(.) = kω + (1− k)µ0 and
V (k) = −Et=1[(kω + (1− k)µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω)2]
= −(1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2.
Now consider x = k+η1, where η1 ∈ (0, k). By Lemma 1, the manager implements
a perfectly revealing information system so that µs,π = ω, Â(.) = (k + η1)ω + (1−
k − η1)µ0 and
V (k + η1) = −Et=1[((k + η1)ω + (1− k − η1)µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω)2]
= −Et=1[(η1(ω − µ0) + (1− k)(µ0 − ω))2]
= −η21Et=1[(ω − µ0)2]− (1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2
= −η21V ar(ω)− (1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2
< −(1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2
= V (k).
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Similarly, V (k − η1) < V (k). Now consider x = k + η2, where η2 ≥ k. By Lemma
1, the manager does not implement an information system so Â(.) = µ0 and
V (k + η2) = −Et=1[(µ0 − kω − (1− k)ω)2]
= −Et=1[(−k(ω − µ0) + (1− k)(µ0 − ω))2]
= −k2Et=1[(ω − µ0)2]− (1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2
= −k2V ar(ω)− (1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2
< −η21V ar(ω)− (1− k)2(µ0 − ω)2
= V (k + η1)
< V (k).
It follows that the manager will implement a perfectly revealing information system
and reveal the signal to a fraction k of users.
Proof of Lemma 2: Differentiating the manager’s objective in (8) and using (7)


























If k ≤ x2 , then (15) is negative for any precision in the domain, and the manager
does not implement an information system (equivalently, sets β = 0). If k > x2 ,
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then there exist βc(x) that satisfies FOC:
(2k − x)x





































because k > x2 . Lastly, note that that β
c(x) is single peaked at x = k because, by











> 0 if x < k,
= 0 if x = k,
< 0 if x > k.
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= 2β(k − x)
α(α + β) . (18)
The critical points satisfying (17) and (18) simultaneously are
(x, β) ∈ {(k, β̃), (0, 0), (2k, 0)},









































so |H1| < 0 and |H2| > 0. Therefore (xcUD, βcUD) = (k, β̃). Next note that β̃ =
βc(x = k). Hence, if the manager can choose the fraction of informed users, she
will set xcUD = k and βcUD ≡ βc(x = k).
Proof of Proposition 4: The result for the manager follows by revealed prefer-
ence. To evaluate the users’ preferences, note that a user who observes a signal









(µ0 + β(ε+ δ)


























= 1(α + β)2 > 0. (19)
It immediately follows that
Et=1[u(â(s, β), ω)] ≥ Et=1[u(â(∅), ω)],∀β ≥ 0. (20)
Case k ≤ 12 : By Lemma 2 and Proposition 3, the manager implements an
information system only under UD. The uninformed users are indifferent, because
they do not observe a signal under either of the regimes. By (20), the informed
users are better off under UD.
Case k > 12 : By Lemma 2 and Proposition 3, the manager implements an
information system under both regimes. By (20), the uninformed users are strictly
better off under MD (because they observe a signal, while under UD they do not).
By Lemma 2 and (19), the informed users strictly prefer UD.





(Et=1[u(â(s, β), ω)]− Et=1[u(â(∅), ω)]) =
∂
∂β
Et=1[u(â(s, β), ω)] > 0
by (19). Then, by Lemma 2, φc(x) ≡ Et=1[u(â(s, βc(x)), ω)] − Et=1[u(â(∅), ω)] is
decreasing in ∆x ≡ |x− k|.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the differential of the welfare terms under the
two regimes:
∆W ≡ W cUD −W cMD = kφcUD − φcMD.
The sign of ∆W is nontrivial (because k < 1 by assumption but φcUD > φcMD
by Corollary 2). Note that limc→0 βcMD = limc→0 βcUD → ∞. Note that for j =
UD,MD,







α(α + βcj )
.
It follows that limc→0 φcMD = limc→0 φcUD = 1α and hence
lim
c→0
∆W ∝ k − 1 < 0.






However, φcMD reaches zero weakly faster than kφcUD if k ≤ 12(
√












Note that, if C(c, β) = cβ22 , then β
c
























2k − 1 ≥ 1,
if k ≤ 12(
√
5 − 1). In other words, φcMD reaches zero weakly faster than kφcUD if
k ≤ k̃ ≡ 12(
√
5 − 1) ∈ (12 , 1). It follows that for c sufficiently high and k ≤ k̃,
∆W ≥ 0.
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Proof of Lemma 3: Let
Πc(x) ≡ λ[V (x, βc(x))− C(c, βc(x))] +W c(x)
denote the objective function of the planner with costly implementation, where
βc(x) = arg max
β
V (x, β)− C(c, β).




























βc(x)(1 + 2λ(k − x))
α










. Given that 1
α+βc(x) > 0, x̂
c
RD satisfies
g(x)|x=x̂cRD = 0. Next observe that, if C(c, β) =
cβ2
2 , then β
c(x) satisfies
(2k − x)x
(α + βc(x))2 − cβ
c(x) = 0 (21)








= (k − x)(α + β
c(x))




c(x)(1 + 2λ(k − x))
α
+ k − x2k − x.
Note that x̂cRD ≥ k because




Observe that x̂cRD < 2k (to satisfy the implementation constraint), because by
Lemma 2, if x ≥ 2k, then βc(x) = 0. If k ≤ 12 , then it follows directly that x̂
c
RD < 1
(because 2k < 1). However, if k > 12 , then x̂
c
RD < 1 only if c sufficiently high. To
see why first consider c = 0.
lim
c→0
g(x = 1) = limc→0 β
c(x = 1)(1 + 2λ(k − 1))
α
+ k − 12k − 1 > 0
because when k > 12 then 1 + 2λ(k−1) > 1 + 2λ(
1
2 −1) = 1−λ ≥ 0 (because λ ≤ 1
by assumption) and limc→0 βc(x = 1) → ∞. In other words, if c = 0 and k > 12 ,
the planner sets xcRD = 1. However,
g(x = 1) = β
c(x = 1)(1 + 2λ(k − 1))
α
+ k − 12k − 1
∝ βc(x = 1)(2k − 1)(1 + 2λ(k − 1)) + (k − 1)α < 0,
if βc(x = 1) is sufficiently low, which by Lemma 2 occurs when c is sufficiently high
(recall that limc→∞ βc(x = 1) = 0). It follows that xcRD < 1 if c is sufficiently high
for any k.





















∝ 1 + 2λ(k − x
c
RD)

























< 0, because xcRD ∈ (k, 2k);
(iii) 1 + 2λ(k − xcRD) > 0 if λ ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, recall from the preceding
discussion in the proof that xcRD < Min{2k, 1}. Therefore, if k ≤ 12 , then
Min{2k, 1} = 2k and 1 + 2λ(k − xcRD) > 1 + 2λ(k − 2k) = 1 − 2λk >
1 − 2k > 0 (because λ ≤ 1 by assumption). If k > 12 , then Min{2k, 1} = 1
and 1 + 2λ(k − xcRD) > 1 + 2λ(k − 1) > 1 + 2λ(12 − 1) = 1− λ ≥ 0 (because
λ ≤ 1 by assumption).
Proof of Proposition 6: The manager’s expected payoff is:








2 (µs,π − µ0)− kω
)2− (µ0 + ω2 − (1− k)ω
)2
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Let define D ≡ x2 − x2 and rewrite the expected payoff of the manager as:
V H(D, π) = −Et=1
[(
D





2 − (1− k)ω
)2
Step 1: Suppose D is exogenous and the manager chooses
πH(D) ≡ arg max
π
V H(D, π).
Following the logic of the proofs of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 it is straightforward
to show that if k > D4 (k ≤
D
4 ) the manager implements a perfectly informative
system (does not implement an information system).
Step 2: Following the logic of the proof of Proposition 1, it is straightforward
to show that V H(D) ≡ V H(D, πH(D)) is single peaked at D = 2k.
Step 3: Recall that D ≡ x2 − x2. The manager wants to disseminate the
signal to a fraction of informed users that satisfies x2 − x2 = 2k. Let define
f(x) ≡
√
2k + (x)2 − x. Then, the partition of users to whom the manager wants




2k + (xo)2 =
√
2k < 1 achieves maximum payoff to the manager.
Next, consider k < 12 and x
oo = xo + ξ = ξ with ξ > 0 arbitrarily small. There
exist xoo =
√
2k + (xoo)2 =
√
2k + ξ2 that achieves the same maximum payoff to
the manager. Given that x ≤ 1 by assumption, the pair (x, x) with largest x that
achieves this payoff is (
√
1− 2k, 1). Note, that if k < 12 , then
√
1− 2k > 0. Next,
consider k = 12 . Then, the only pair (x, x) that achieves this payoff is (0, 1). Now
note that, if k > 12 , then
√
2k + x2 > 1 for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Given that 0 ≤ x ≤ x ≤ 1
by assumption, the manager sets x = 0 and x = 1.






− 1 < 1− 1 = 0 and ∂f(.)
∂k
= 1√
2k+x2
> 0.
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